We investigate whether the direction and magnitude of earnings ma nagement by firms is affected by the sensitivity of their stock prices to earnings news. We argue that firms with high price sensitivity to relatively small earnings surprises are more likely to direct their earnings management toward meeting or beating analysts' earnings forecasts than firms whose price sensitivity to earnings news is low. As a consequence, these firms are more likely to engage in either income-increasing or income-decreasing earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or above analysts' forecasts and are less likely to engage in extreme, incomedecreasing earnings management than other firms. In contrast, firms with low price sensitivity to earnings news are more likely to engage in reserve-creating earnings management, leading to negative (i.e., bad news) forecast errors than other firms. The level of analysts' outstanding stock recommendations is used as proxy for contemporaneous stock price and, hence, firms' sensitivity to earnings news. Consistent with our predictions, after being rated a Buy (Sell) firms are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly above analysts' forecasts. In contrast, after being rated a Sell (Buy) firms are more (less) likely to engage in extreme, income-decreasing earnings management that leads to extremely negative forecast errors. Our empirical results provide direct evidence of purported but, heretofore, weakly documented equity market incentives for firms to manage earnings. They are also consistent with a growing body of literature that finds analysts either cannot anticipate or are not motivated to anticipate perfectly in their forecasts firms' efforts to manage earnings.
Introduction
The belief that firms' earnings management is motivated by equity market considerations is pervasive. Few studies, however, have documented a direct link between variables related to stock values and measures of earnings management. In this paper, we analyze how an equity market consideration-a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news-affects the direction and magnitude of its earnings management.
Following prior research (e.g., Healy [1985] ), we assume that income-increasing or income-decreasing earnings management undertaken in the current period may be used to report earnings that meet or slightly beat relevant earnings targets (e.g., contracting and equity market targets). However, if the sum of available accounting reserves and pre-managed earnings is insufficient to achieve any relevant earnings target, firms are expected to undertake extreme, income-decreasing earnings management to maximize accounting reserves for future use (i.e., take an "earnings bath"). One prediction that follows from these rules for managing earnings is that firms whose stock prices are highly sensitive to current earnings surprises (defined as analysts' forecasts errors) are more likely to undertake income-increasing earnings management than firms with low stock price sensitivity to earnings news. This prediction follows from the fact that firms concerned with reporting earnings that meet or beat both contracting targets and analysts' forecasts will have fewer opportunities to create accounting reserves via income-decreasing actions than firms less concerned with meeting their earnings forecasts.
The link between equity market incentives and earnings management has implications for analysts' forecast errors. Specifically, if analysts do not completely anticipate the effects of firms' earnings management in their forecasts, there will be a correspondence between firms' earnings management and analysts' forecast errors. First, there will be a correspondence between strategic income-increasing and income-decreasing earnings management actions and the incidence of reported earnings observations that are equal to or are slightly above analysts' forecasts. Second, there will be a correspondence between extreme, income-decreasing earnings management and large negative (i.e., bad news) analysts' forecast errors. More important for the purposes of this paper, the incidence of both types of "unusual" forecast errors and corresponding earnings management is predicted to vary as a function of firms' ex ante stock price sensitivity to earnings news and, hence, their incentive to report earnings that meet or beat the equity market target of analysts' outstanding earnings forecasts.
Using stock recommendations as a measure of a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, we show that the incidence of zero and small, ex post positive (i.e., good news) analyst forecast errors increases in the favorableness of outstanding stock recommendations. We link this finding to evidence of earnings management by demonstrating that the incidence of zero and small positive forecast errors does not differ across recommendation categories when forecast errors are based on estimates of pre-managed earnings. 1 We also provide evidence of a correspondence between extreme, income-decreasing earnings management and extreme, negative analysts'
forecast errors. Specifically, we demonstrate a correspondence between the incidence of extreme, income-decreasing actions by firms and the incidence of extreme, negative analysts' forecast errors, and we show that both outcomes simultaneously decrease in the favo rableness of the outstanding stock recommendations.
Our results are consistent with a growing body of literature that finds analysts are unable or unmotivated to anticipate fully firms' earnings management in forecasts (see, e.g., Hanna [1999] , Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999] , Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000a] , and Baber and Kang [2001] ). In addition, the results suggest that there are ex ante equity market-based variables that can predict simultaneously the sign and magnitude of both firm earnings mana gement and resulting analysts' forecast errors. Finally, our analysis and evidence provide a basis for reinterpreting a number of empirical regularities reported in the literature on contracting incentives for earnings management, analyst expectations mana gement, and the association between stock recommendations and analysts' forecast errors.
1 Matsumoto [1999] , Brown [1999] , and Burgstahler and Eames [1999] also report unusual frequencies of zero and small positive forecast errors. Each of these studies refers to earnings expectations management as an explanation for this result. Consistent with the argument in this paper, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999] attribute the finding to earnings management. None of these studies, however, offers direct evidence of actions by firms to manage earnings or identifies ex ante conditions under which firms are more likely to report earnings that meet or slightly beat forecasts.
We develop our hypotheses in the next section. Section 3 describes the variables and data employed in our empirical tests. Section 4 presents the empirical results. In section 5 we discuss competing explanations for some of our findings. Section 6 provides a reinterpretation of prior evidence from the earnings management and analyst forecast error literature in light of our empirical findings. A summary and conclusions are offered in section 7.
Hypotheses Development and Related Research
Earnings management to influence stock values, whether assumed to be an opportunistic action by managers or action taken in the best interests of shareholders, is a given in capital markets. 2 However, researchers have proceeded slowly in their attempts to understand earnings management in response to equity market incentives. This condition reflects, arguably, an overly strict interpretation of the implications of the efficient markets hypothesis that has led some researchers to conclude that earnings management intended to influence stock prices is opportunistic, uninformative, and futile. As such, until recently, empirical tests intended to detect earnings management were based, primarily, on hypotheses derived from the contracting literature. Despite the presumption that the practice of earnings management is ubiquitous, contracting-based hypotheses have, nevertheless, proven to be of limited use in guiding successful empirical efforts to detect it. Recent literature reviews by Healy and Wahlen [1999] and Dechow and Skinner [2000] arrive at a similar conclusion.
The objective of this paper is to develop and test empirically hypotheses concerning both the effects of introducing equity market-based earnings targets on firms' earnings management, and the effects of such earnings management actions on ensuing analysts' forecast errors. In this section we formulate empirical predictions of differences in firms' earnings management behavior and analysts' forecast errors conditional on the incentive to report earnings that meet or beat analysts' forecasts. This incentive is argued to be increasing in firms' stock price sensitivity to current earnings news.
Earnings targets and earnings management under GAAP
The fundamental notion that firms manage earnings implies that managers are willing to forego reporting income in one period to enhance the possibility that they will meet earnings goals in another period. The fact that managers are willing to make such tradeoffs may reflect either efficient management of private information (say, to inform outsiders or to improve contracting within the firm) or opportunistic behavior.
We consider three commonly cited cases of earnings management with respect to relevant earnings targets (see, e.g., Levitt [1998] and Hwang and Ryan [2000] ). The first case arises when pre-managed earnings for the period are realized below a relevant earnings target and available reserves are insufficient to inflate earnings to meet the target. For such realizations, managers are expected to choose their next best option and take an earnings bath to maximize either valuable accounting reserves or payback borrowing from the past. 3 This will result in a reported earnings number that is artificially low by extreme amounts. Levitt [1998] refers to this case as an "earnings bath," i.e., extreme, income-decreasing earnings management when no relevant earnings target limits the creation of reserves. The second case arises when firms' pre-managed earnings fall below a relevant earnings target but by an amount less than the maximum available accounting reserves. These firms are expected to use stored reserves (or to borrow amounts from the future) to inflate earnings, thus meeting or slightly beating the target. 4 The last case occurs when a firm's pre-managed earnings realization exceeds a relevant earnings target. Because reserves are assumed to be valuable, firms will deflate earnings to a reported level equal to or slightly above the relevant 3 Our analysis assumes that accounting reserves, i.e., the capacity to inflate earnings in the future, are valuable to firms. This is consistent with managers' using accounting discretion to signal information about future firm prospects in a "fully" rational setting (see, e.g., Subramanyam [1996] , Dye [1988] , Verrecchia [1986] , Kirschenheiter and Melumad [1999] ), or attempting to fool either the market or parties that contract with the firm (see, e.g., Teoh and Wong [1997] ). We do not attempt to differentiate between these possibilities in this paper. 4 The prediction that firms might prefer to slightly beat rather than exactly meet targets can be supported by a number of intuitive explanations but has, nevertheless, never been formalized in the earnings management or analyst forecast literature. We acknowledge this shortcoming in the analysis and take this behavior as given, as has been done in prior studies.
target, thus reserving a portion of the current good performance for future use (or to pay back past borrowing). Levitt [1998] refers to this case as cookie jar reserving.
5
These exogenously defined rules for mapping pre-managed to reported earnings are similar to those assumed by Healy [1985] . The choice was intentional, as these rules have formed the implicit basis for a number of hypotheses tested in studies examining earnings management in contracting as well as regulatory settings. Most of these studies allow for or depend on the possibility that, in any given period, the realization of pre-managed earnings relative to the earnings target can lead a firm to take an earnings bath, inflate earnings to meet the target (subject to accounting constraints), or create cookie jar reserves. Use of the same basic framework employed in previous literature facilitates an evaluation of the impact of introducing incentives to achieve equity market earnings expectations on both firms' earnings management and analysts' forecast errors.
The effect of equity market earnings targets
Using the preceding rules and an example adapted from Abarbanell [1999] , we develop the intuition underlying our empirical predictions concerning the effects of introducing equity market earnings targets on firms' earnings management and analysts' forecast errors. The analysis is summarized in figure 1 . The figure depicts the predicted direction of earnings management in various regions of the distribution of possible pre-managed earnings outcomes for two representative firms, one with a weak incentive to report earnings that meet or beat analysts'
forecasts and one with a strong incentive to do so. It is assumed that all firms face a relevant earnings threshold, denoted T, that is fixed, say, by a contract at the beginning of the period. To simplify the discussion, T is assumed to be an unbiased expectation of pre-managed earnings known at the beginning of the period. 5 Avoidance of ratcheting effects has been identified as an additional motivation for cookie jar reserves in prior studies; see, e.g., Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999] . 6 The predictions offered below could apply to a variety of assumed distributions of firms' pre -managed earnings with a variety of assumed location parameters. For example, pre-managed earnings distributions could be skewed (say, because the initial target was set lower than the expected pre-managed earnings outcome), and many of the basic arguments that follow would continue to hold. Other results would hold with relatively mild additional assumptions 6
The equity market target of analysts' forecasts is dis tinguished from the contracting-based target T by the fact that it can be revised during the period to reflect the arrival of new information. For simplicity, the analysts' initial forecast is assumed to equal the unbiased expectation of pre-managed earnings, T. Depending on new information acquired during the period and possible randomness in forecasting, revised forecasts can take on realized values at the end of the period equal to T, or to values above or below T (represented by F i =F A or F B , respectively, in figure 1 ). 7 We note that the characterization of forecasts being directed at an estimate of pre-managed (rather than reported) earnings is consistent with the assumption that analysts are unable or unmotivated to fully anticipate the managed component of reported earnings. A number of recent studies provide theoretical and empirical support for this assumption.
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In figure 1 , firms with a weak incentive to meet forecasts but an incentive to meet the target T take an earnings bath and report earnings equal to E min when pre-managed earnings fall below T by more than available reserves (denoted k), inflate pre-managed earnings to T when they are below T by less than k, and deflate pre-managed earnings to T when earnings are above the level T. By contrast, firms with a strong incentive to meet both contracting targets and analysts'
forecasts take a bath and report earnings equal to E min when pre-managed earnings are below F B about parameters of the distribution and the level of available accounting reserves. Note, also, that it is possible for the value of T to be set by contracting parties with rational conjectures about the sign and magnitude of earnings management that will be undertaken for given pre-managed earnings outcomes (see Kirschenheiter and Melumad [1999] ). 7 Forecasting need not be perfect in our setting. For example, analysts' forecasts can be based on a signal that is equal to true pre-managed earnings plus a normally distributed error with a zero mean. This raises the possibility that one reason for firms to manage earnings is to eliminate noise in earnings surprises without disclosing proprietary information or committing to policies of managing analysts' expectations without credible disclosure. 8 The analysis in Fischer and Verrecchia [2000] suggests that users of financial reports may be incapable of completely unraveling reporting bias when managers' objective functions are unobservable. As discussed in Abarbanell [1999] and Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000a] , even if analysts and investors are able to anticipate reporting bias, a question arises as to whether they have an economic incentive to incorporate it into their forecasts. Ultimately, the question is an empirical one. The results in Lehavy [2000a, 2000b] and Hanna [1999] provide direct evidence that analysts do not fully incorporate firm reporting biases in their forecasts. Evidence construed as unforecasted earnings management is consistent with the presence of cognitive biases inherent to analysts that are exacerbated when firms manipulate earnings, the presence of analysts' incentives that are asymmetric in the sign of reported earnings-based forecast errors that are binding at the same time firms have an incentive to manage earnings, or a completely rational and unbiased equilibrium in which analysts are not able or motivated to forecast firm earnings management in all situations. It should be noted that the assumption that analysts do not anticipate completely firms' earnings management is implicit in the conclusions drawn in Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser [1999] , Burgstahler and Eames [2000] , and Baber and Kang [2001] , among others.
by more than k, inflate pre-managed earnings to F B when earnings are below F B by less than k, inflate pre-managed earnings to T when earnings are below T by less than k, inflate pre-managed earnings to F A when earnings are below F A by less than k, and, finally, deflate pre-managed earnings to F A when earnings are above F A .
9
As seen in figure 1 , the preceding rules for earnings management lead to two intervals of pre-managed earnings outcomes in which firms with strong incentives to meet forecasts behave differently from those with weak incentives. The first interval, denoted I 1 , is composed of premanaged earnings realizations that fall below T by more than k, but below F B by less than k. In these cases pre-managed earnings are mapped to F B rather than to the minimum earnings report, E min . That is, pre-managed earnings realizations that, absent strong incentives to meet the forecasts, would have been deflated to an artificially low reported earnings number, are inflated instead to a reported earnings number equal to or slightly in excess of the forecast. The second interval, denoted I 2 , is composed of pre-managed realizations that fall above T but below F A by less than k. These realizations are inflated by firms with strong incentives to meet forecasts, whereas firms with weak incentives will deflate earnings to T. 10 The expected direction of earnings management is the same between the two types of firms for all other pre-managed earnings outcomes; therefore, combining the expected direction of firms' earnings management behavior in these two intervals produces the following prediction:
The incidence of income-increasing earnings management behavior increases in the incentive to report earnings that meet or beat forecasts (i.e., increases in a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news).
9 Note that in this example firms with strong incentives to meet forecasts will also be concerned about achieving the contracting target subject to meeting the analyst forecast target whenever possible. That is, the example abstracts from possible equilibria that can arise in a multi-period setting in which the firm may have incentives to create reserves even when one or both earnings targets are attainable with income -increasing earnings management. 10 To simplify the discussion we have drawn the graph so that F A -k is equal to T. Although there are quantitative effects when this condition is not met, what does not change are the qualitative differences between the earnings management behavior and forecast errors of firms as a function of their incentives to meet analysts' expectations for normal or approximately normal distributions of pre-managed earnings.
The next prediction relates to the correspondence between a firm's earnings management actions and subsequently observed analysts' forecast errors. Specifically, if analysts' forecasts do not completely anticipate firm earnings management, then the stronger the firm's incentive to report earnings that meet or beat analysts' forecasts, the larger will be the asymmetry near the middle of a firm's conditional (on the outstanding forecast) distribution of forecast errors. This asymmetry takes the form of an artificially high number of possible reported earnings outcomes that are equal to or slightly above the outstanding forecast. As seen in figure 1 , when pre-managed earnings are below T, firms with high stock price sensitivity to earnings news are more likely than firms with low sensitivity to engage in income-increasing earnings management to meet or slightly beat analysts' forecasts. Pre-managed earning outcomes in the interval I 1 account for this difference. Similarly when pre-managed earnings are above T, firms with high stock price sensitivity will engage in either income-increasing (in the interval I 2 ) or income-decreasing earnings management (outcomes above those in I 2 ) to meet or slightly beat forecasts. The preceding argument is formalized in the following hypothesis:
The incidence of zero and small positive forecasts errors increases in the incentive to report earnings that meet or beat earnings forecasts (i.e., increases in stock price sensitivity to earnings news).
A testable implication of the arguments underlying H 2 is that the reduction in the incidence of zero and small positive forecast errors when forecast errors are based on pre-managed rather than reported earnings will increase in firms' stock price sensitivity to earnings news. Such a test is performed in section 4 along with direct tests of the prediction in H 2 .
The arguments underlying our two final predictions are also summarized with the aid of figure 1. The arrows in the figure indicate that when pre-managed earnings fall far below or rise far above all relevant earnings targets, firms are expected to engage in extreme, income-decreasing earnings management. Such cases of earnings baths and extreme cookie jar reserves will be associated with a second asymmetry in expected forecast error distribution for firms regardless of the strength of their incentive to meet or beat forecasts, i.e., an artificially high incidence of extreme, negative forecast errors. Formally, we predict that:
H 3a : Extreme negative forecast errors are associated with extreme, income-decreasing earnings management.
Our final prediction concerning forecast errors follows from the introduction of equity market incentives on firms' earnings management behavior. As seen in figure 1, for pre-managed earnings outcomes that fall into the interval I 1 and above F A , firms with low sensitivity to earnings news engage in more frequent and more extreme, income-decreasing earnings management that in turn leads to extreme, negative errors than firms with high sensitivity. This follows from the fact that in the interval I 1 , these firms take an earnings bath, while firms with a high sensitivity manage earnings upward to meet or beat forecasts. The prediction is reinforced by the fact that firms with low sensitivity will also take systematically larger cookie jar reserves with progressively larger realizations of pre-managed earnings that fall above F A . The argument is formalized in our final hypothesis:
The frequency and magnitude of extreme, income-decreasing earnings management and corresponding extreme, negative analysts' forecast errors decrease in firms' incentive to meet or beat forecasts (i.e., decrease in stock price sensitivity to earnings news).
We end this section with some observations on the use of our analysis to interpret evidence from prior research and on how our own predictions may be differentiated from others in the literature. Note that earnings management that takes the form of earnings baths and extreme cookie jar reserves will tend to drive means of realized cross-sectional forecast error distributions toward negative values (i.e., ex post analyst optimism). Similarly, earnings management performed to meet or beat analysts' forecasts will tend to increase the percentage of positive forecast errors and raise the value of the median forecast error in realized cross-sectional forecast error distributions. The values of these distributional summary statistics in any quarter will depend on the relative strength of incentives in the cross section to fulfill market earnings expectations.
Mean optimism and a high frequency of positive errors have been documented in prior research, and many cognitive and incentive-based explanations have been proposed to account for apparent systematic errors in analysts' forecasts (see discussion in Abarbanell and Le havy [2000a] and section 6 of this paper). It should be recognized that the empirical validity of our hypotheses requires a correspondence between firm earnings management and forecast errors that leads to both asymmetries in realized cross sectional forecast error distributions, and that the size of these asymmetries differs, depending on firms' stock price sensitivity to earnings news. Thus, while our hypotheses may imply certain characteristics of summary statistics reported in the literature, such as mean optimism in the cross section, they demand more of the data than consistency with these known empirical regularities.
Stock recommendations as a measure of firms' stock price sensitivity to earnings news
A number of factors are likely to contrib ute to a firm's stock price sensitivity to current earnings news. These include firm-specific expected earnings growth, investor preferences/sentiment, and financial distress. Hagin [1991] and Sloan and Skinner [2000] report that small, bad news earnings surprises lead to negative stock price reactions of a larger magnitude than positive stock reactions to good news earnings surprises of a comparable magnitude. 11 They demonstrate that this "torpedo" effect is the strongest among firms with high price-to-earnings and market-to-book ratios and expected growth. These variables have been used in the literature as an indicator of investment style (e.g., glamour versus value). We argue that firms with higher growth expectations and glamour designations have stronger incentives to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts' earnings forecasts than other firms. Conversely, we argue that value firms, firms with high leverage, as well as firms facing financial distress have relatively weaker incentives than other firms to manage earnings to meet or beat analysts' forecasts. This argument is supported by the evidence in Dhaliwal, Lee, and Fargher [1991] , Dhaliwal and Reynolds [1994] , and Subramanyam and Wild [1996] , which indicates that firms with both high financial leverage and financial distress have less sensitive stock price reactions to earnings surprises than do either firms with lower leverage or firms in good financial health.
We choose to measure the construct of stock price sensitivity to earnings surprises with stock recommendations outstanding contemporaneous to analysts' forecasts. Our choice of stock recommendations is based, in part, on an extensive literature that links stock recommendations with the same variables that have been shown to be associated with asymmetric price reactions to earnings surprises. For example, a number of empirical studies confirm that the favorableness of stock recommendations increases in expected long-term earnings growth, price-to-earnings, and market-to-book ratios, and decreases in debt-to-equity ratios and measures of financial distress (see, e.g., Stickel [1995 and 2001] , Finger and Landsman [1998] , Womack [1996] , Kriche and Lee
[2000]), and Barber et al. [2001] ). In results not tabled we confirm that these individual relations hold in our sample. Because these financial variables are related to stock recommendations in directions that are mutually reinforcing with respect to capturing ex ante price sensitivity to earnings news, this empirical evidence suggests that stock recommendation can serve as something akin to a latent variable for measuring a collection of firm incentives to report earnings that meet or beat analysts' forecasts.
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We chose stock recommendations to measure price sensitivity to earnings news for two other reasons. First, in addition to being issued or outstanding contemporaneous to earnings forecasts, recommendations are generated by the same source, i.e., analysts. This implies that the information in analysts' earnings forecasts aligns with the information in the recommendation and that it is possible, in principle, that analysts can produce a strategic forecast accounting for a firm's 12 An alternative approach to choosing a contemp oraneous measure is to use an historical estimate of price sensitivity; e.g., prior announcement period ERCs. However, this approach leads to potential staleness in the measure of sensitivity. It also introduces a potential endogeneity problem if the prior response to earnings news was affected by earnings management embedded in prior earnings surprises. For example, a weak price response in the prior period may have been the result of the firm's taking an earnings bath. Such cases will, at a minimum, introduce noise into a measure of price sensitivity and will, in crucial instances, significantly bias tests against finding support for predictions.
expected reporting response to the recommendation. If analysts' incorporate in their earnings forecasts a firm's expected response to their recommendations, we should not find results consistent with our hypotheses. A second advantage to using stock recommendations is that doing so allows a comparison of our findings to those in the emerging stock recommendation literature, which furthers our goals of using both our hypotheses and empirical results to offer alternative interpretations of previous research findings.
Finally, we note that if stock recommendations are the actual cues to which investors and managers respond, eve n a coarse partitioning scheme is likely to be effective at capturing incentives for firms to manage earnings relative to outstanding forecasts. If, instead, recommendations only summarize the actual variables that influence stock price sensitivity to current earnings news and incentives to manage earnings, use of coarsely partitioned recommendations will imply reduced power to detect earnings management but will not bias the results in favor of our hypotheses.
In section 4 we confirm empirically the ability of outstanding stock recommendations to reflect the sensitivity of stock price to earnings surprises of the type predicted by our hypotheses, before presenting our main results.
Sample Selection Criteria, Description, and Variable Definition
We use analyst stock recommendations and quarterly earnings forecasts provided by Zacks Investment Research. The recommendation data cover the period 1985 through early 1998. The recommendation database includes more than 400,000 recommendations with ratings between 1 and 5. A rating of 1 indicates a Strong Buy recommendation, 2 a Buy, 3 a Hold, 4 a Sell, and 5 a Strong Sell (see Barber et al. for a more detailed description of the recommendation database).
The Zacks earnings forecasts database contains more than 2 million individual quarterly forecasts for the period 1985-1998. Actual earnings are obtained from Compustat. All earnings and forecasts have been adjusted to ensure consistent results that take account of stock splits.
For each covered firm, we construct the average recommendation and average earnings forecast of earnings on the last day of its fiscal quarter. To reduce potential effects of stale recommendations, the average recommendation for firm i on date t (A it ) is based on the last three individua l recommendations issued prior to the end of its fiscal quarter; results are qualitatively similar when average recommendations are based on the full consensus. Using the average recommendation outstanding on the last day of a firm's fiscal quarter, we place each of the covered firms into one of three portfolios. The first portfolio consists of firms for which 1≤A it ≤2
(denoted "Buy" stocks); the second portfolio includes firms for which 2<A it ≤3 ("Hold" stocks);
the third contains the least favorably recommended firms for which A it >3 ("Sell" stocks).
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We calculate forecast errors as actual earnings per share, minus the average earnings forecast outstanding at the end of the fiscal quarter, all scaled by beginning-of-period stock price.
To eliminate effects of stale forecasts on the accuracy of the forecast error, we calculate the average earnings forecast based on the last three forecasts issued prior to the end of the firm's fiscal quarter. The most recent forecast outstanding for a firm on the last day of the fiscal quarter and the full consensus forecast are used for sensitivity tests. The results are qualitatively similar for the full consensus forecast, the last three forecasts, and the most recent forecast outstanding at fiscal quarter end. Sample selection procedures result in 23,282 average recommendations and forecast errors at fiscal quarter end.
We use quarterly unexpected accruals to proxy for firms' earnings management.
Unexpected accruals are the measure produced by the modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] ) applied to quarterly data (see the appendix for calculations). All the empirical results presented in section 4 are qualitatively unchanged when cross-sectional (see DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994] ), and instrumental variable approaches (e.g., Kang and Sivaramakrishnan [1995] ) are used to estimate unexpected accruals. To facilitate comparison with our forecast error measure, we express unexpected accruals on per-share and scaled by price. Note that Zacks, like other databases, removes special items, restructuring charges, and other one-time items from consensus earnings estimates that are used in our robustness tests. Such practices may inadvertently eliminate actual cases of earnings management from reported earnings (see Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000b] ). For the purposes of sensitivity tests described later, we also calculate a measure of unexpected accruals that excludes these special items, and we use this adjusted measure in conjunction with Zacks' consensus forecast estimates and actual reported earnings (which also exclude such items). Because results using these variations are qualitatively similar to the results discussed in section 4, only results based on the Jones Model estimates of unexpected accruals are reported in this paper.
Application of the modified Jones Model resulted in 38,545 firm-quarter measures of quarterly unexpected accruals for all companies in the recommendation/forecast database.
Combining the unexpected accrual measures with the end of fiscal quarter recommendations and forecast errors yields a sample of 22,173 firm-quarter observations for 1,656 distinct firms.
Results concerning forecast error predictions are qualitatively similar when data requirements for estimating unexpected accruals are not imposed.
Panel A of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on analyst recommendations.
Recommendations are significantly skewed toward Buys (average 36%), with only 13% rated Sells. One intriguing pattern found in these data is that the number of Buy recommend ations has increased significantly over time, while the number of Sell recommendations has decreased less significantly.
Panel B of Table 1 
Empirical Results

The association between recommendations and stock price reactions to earnings surprises
Before presenting test results concerning the hypotheses offered in section 2, we provide evidence of stock recommendations' ability to proxy for stock price sensitivity to earnings news.
To that end, we compute the coefficients from regressions of earnings announcement date returns on forecast errors of a relatively small magnitude for each recommendation portfolio. 
Earnings management and small positive forecast errors
Panel A of table 2 reports results consistent with H 1 . The mean, median, and percentage of positive unexpected accruals increase in the favorableness of stock recommendation (columns 1-3). For example, the incidence of positive unexpected accruals is 52% for firms rated a Buy compared to 46% for firms rated a Sell. Similarly, the mean unexpected accrual decreases monotonically from a value of 0.076 for firms rated a Buy, to -0.109 for those rated a Hold, to -1.308 for firms rated a sell. Differences between individual stock recommendation groups are 14 Announcement date returns are the cumulative market-adjusted returns in the three-day window around and including the announcement date. A small number of influential observations identified using the studentized residual method are eliminated from each regression. 15 Buy firm response coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level in every interval, Hold firm response coefficients are reliably different from zero in all but the smallest interval, and Sell firm response coefficients are insignificantly different from zero in all but the largest interval. Differences in response coefficient across recommendation groups are significant in each interval.
highly significant (see columns 1-4 in panel B of table 2). Additional evidence consistent with the arguments underlying H 1 is provided below, along with evidence concerning H 2 .
The visual evidence in figure 2 speaks directly to the prediction in H 2 that stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock recommendation, affects firms' incentives to meet or slightly beat analysts' forecasts. The figure presents a histogram of forecast errors in the range between the values -1 and +1. Not surprisingly, the majority of these observations fall within a small region around a value of zero. It is clear from the figure that, consistent with H 2 , the incidence of zero forecast errors increases monotonically in the favorableness of stock recommendations (8.9%, 6.5%, and 4.7% for Buy, Hold, and Sell, respectively). Differences in percentages of zero forecast errors across groups are highly significant (unreported in tables).
It is also clear from figure 2 that, within the smallest symmetric regions around zero forecast errors, the incidence of positive errors increases in the favorableness of the stock recommendation. Statistical support for this conclus ion is presented in table 3. Columns 3-6 of this table present the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors based on reported earnings in symmetric regions of ±0.2, ±0.1, ±0.05, and ±0.025 for the whole sample and by stock recommendation portfolio. Consistent with H 2 , the ratio increases in the favorableness of stock recommendations within each region. The ratio for firms rated a Buy is reliably greater than that for firms rated Holds or Sells in all cases, while the ratio for Holds is reliably greater than that for Sells in the two largest intervals. The difference in the ratios across firms rated a Buy, Hold, or
Sell is greatest in the region between ±0.1, where they take on values of 1.46, 1.14, and 0.94, respectively.
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Columns 7-10 of table 3 present the results of recomputing the ratio of positive to negative errors pertaining to observations in columns 3-6 after subtracting an estimate of unexpected 16 Mean earnings of firms rated Buy, Hold, or Sell in the narrowest interval of forecast errors around zero are $.35, $.38, and $.40, suggesting that firms rated a Buy do not have systematically smaller earnings that could translate into disproportionately smaller forecast errors than other firms. Also, in untabulated results, we confirm that the ratio falls monotonically for all recommendation groups when the symmetric interval centered on zero is expanded beyond ±0.1. It would appear that the amount by which earnings are managed to beat forecasts is limited, consistent with the value of accounting reserves and the decreasing benefit of progressively larger good news surprises described earlier.
accruals from reported earnings, i.e., after forecast errors are placed on a pre-managed earnings basis. The findings in columns 7-10 support a role for equity-market-motivated earnings management in explaining evidence of a tendency for firms to meet or beat forecasts. Specifically, in contrast to the patterns documented in columns 3-6, the pattern of increasing frequency of positive forecast errors in the favorableness of the recommendation is not observed. 17 These results support the arguments underlying H 1 and H 2 that differences in earnings management motivated by firms' stock price sensitivity to earnings news plays a role in the increasing incidence of small positive errors in reported earnings as the favorableness of the stock recommendation increases. 
Earnings management and extreme, negative forecast errors
We begin the tests of H 3a and H 3b with an evaluation of the shapes of the distributions of unexpected accruals and forecast errors. The descriptive evidence in panel B of table 1 indicates that the median unexpected accrual is 0.021 while the mean is -0.172, suggesting some form of skewness in the unconditional unexpected accrual distributions. As seen in panel A of figure 3, which plots the 1st through the 99th percentiles of the distribution of quarterly unexpected accruals, this skewness takes the form of a longer and slightly fatter right versus left tail. Given 17 In the absence of additional structure, one might expect that if pre-managed earnings are symmetrically distributed, the ratio of small positive to small negative errors will take on a value approximately equal to 1 for all firms. The actual ratios of positive to negative forecast errors based on pre-managed earnings are always significantly less than 1, suggesting the possibility of a positive bias in the classification of unexpected accruals. However, two-sided tests of differences in the ratio across recommendation groups are not always significant and are not consistent in sign across in each interval (unreported in tables). Thus, the level of the ratio of positive to negative errors based on pre-managed earnings, and therefore any positive classification bias in the Jones Model, does not appear to be a function of stock recommendation. Moreover, so long as the tendency to misclassify accruals is independent of the analysts' forecast errors, the subtraction of erroneous estimates of positive unexpected accruals would be expected to reduce the number of observations in both the numerator and denominator of the ratio, thus biasing it upward and in the opposite direction of that implied by the arguments underlying H 2 . 18 One concern with the test summarized in table 3 is that the level of error in measuring unexpected accruals exceeds the level of randomness in analysts' forecasts. This raises the possibility that the results in columns 7-10 of the table reflect the effect of adjusting reported earnings numbers with very noisy estimates of unexpected accruals, which could drive the ratio of positive to negative errors on a pre-managed basis toward a value of 1. To test the sensitivity of our results to this concern, we restricted the sample to those observations for which the absolute value of unexpected accruals falls within the absolute range of the small forecast error values. This represents approximately 20% of the observations in each interval examined. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported, suggesting that the reduction in the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors on a pre-managed earnings basis is not simply the result of adding large misestimates of unexpected accruals to reported earnings.
that the evidence reported earlier in table 2, which indicates that the 25th and 75th percentiles of this distribution are similar in magnitude, significant skewness is attributable to the precipitous increase in the magnitude of unexpected accruals in the most extreme, negative tail.
Skewness is also evident in the unconditional forecast error distribution, as the median forecast error reported in table 1 is -0.010 while the mean error is -0.347. This is confirmed in panel B of figure 3, which plots forecast errors of the 1st (most negative) through the 99th (most positive) percentiles of the distribution forecast errors. In the case of forecast errors, the extreme negative tail is even longer and fatter than that of the distribution of unexpected accruals. Evidence that simultaneously links the incidence of extreme, negative observations of both unexpected accruals and forecast errors to the favorableness of stock recommendations is presented in figure 5 . The figure plots the mean unexpected accrual and mean forecast errors within the 1st (most negative) through the 20th (most positive) forecast error portfolios for firms rated Sells, Holds, and Buys. In every recommendation group the most extreme, negative forecast errors go hand-in-hand with the most extreme, negative unexpected accruals, and the magnitude of forecast errors and unexpected accruals in the extreme, negative portfolios decreases in the favorableness of stock recommendation. The result is particularly notable for firms rated a Buy 19 The mean forecast error in each recommendation partition is significantly negative consistent with prior evidence construed as an apparent tendency toward optimism in analysts' forecasts. It can be seen in table 4, however, that firms rated a Buy have a small positive median forecast error and that the percentage of negative errors is only 45%. Even among firms rated a Hold, the incidence of negative errors is only slightly greater (53%) than would occur by chance. Solely in the case of the relatively small set of firms rated a Sell is the incidence of negative forecasts errors unusually high (62%). Thus, the presence of a relatively small number of extremely negative forecasts errors concentrated among firms rated a Sell accounts for a good deal of apparent optimism in the unconditional dis tribution of forecast errors (see Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000a] ). 20 The fact that a small percentage of firms rated a Buy have extremely negative forecasts errors suggests that some firms that analysts expect to perform well end up taking earnings baths because their pre-managed earnings fall short of all relevant targets by more than available reserves. It may also reflect the fact that some firms rated a Buy take extreme cookie jar reserves without regard to outstanding forecasts, suggesting that the incentive to meet analysts' forecasts may not be perfectly monotonic in stock recommendation. High-flying Internet stocks in the late 1990s, for example, were often rated a Buy by analysts while their stock prices appeared to be insensitive to bad current earnings news. Analysis of prior returns and earnings changes in Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000a] and P/E ratios in Conrad, Cornell, and Landsman [2000] suggests that firms' incentives to manage earnings to beat forecasts are unlikely to be perfectly monotonic in any single empirical proxy for stock price sensitivity to earnings news. Finally, as indicated earlier, our results are qualitatively similar when forecast errors are based on consensus forecasts and actual earnings as reported by Zacks, which omit one-time items and write-offs; see, e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy [2000b] . Furthermore, when we adjust our measure of unexpected accruals for such items (see Collins and Hribar [1999] for details of the procedure), results concerning the tail asymmetry are attenuated but quantitatively similar. These findings are consistent with the idea that firms throw in both extreme one-time items and recurring items when they take earnings baths and also when they store large cookie jar reserves (see Rees, Gill, and Gore [1996] for evidence consistent with this interpretation).
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Overall, the empirical evidence presented in this section supports the predictions developed in section 2. Specifically, it indicates that analysts are either unable or unmotivated to forecast firms' earnings management to beat targets and create reserves, leading to predictable associations between unexpected accruals and forecast errors. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that the incentive to manage earnings to meet or beat forecasts increases in the favorableness of stock recommendation while the incentive to take extreme, income-decreasing accruals decreases in the favorableness of stock recommendation.
One distinguishing and particularly valuable feature of our analysis is that it provides a single explanation for the joint existence of several empirical findings related to both conditional and unconditional distributions of unexpected accruals and forecast errors. Nevertheless, competing explanations uncontrolled for in our analysis may explain some individual results, and combinations of competing explanations may explain other results. We discuss these explanations in the next section.
Competing Explanations for the Empirical Results
Misclassification of non-discretionary accruals as discretionary
The possibility exists that non-discretionary accruals were systematically misclassified as discretionary in cases of extreme firm performance. That is, these accruals may be "unexpected"
as calculated by the Jones Model (and may even be unexpected by the analysts themselves) but are not "discretionary." This is consistent with the fact that firms rated a Sell are characterized by 22 Results related to H 3a and H 3b continue to hold when special items are used as a measure of discretion. Like unexpected accruals, special items distributions have longer, fatter negative than positive tails. Observations in this tail are also associated with extremely negative forecast errors, consistent with the intuition that firms with stock prices that are insensitive to current earnings news will not hesitate to use discretion with respect to the timing and magnitude of highly visible income-decreasing special items (i.e., they will "throw in the kitchen sink" when performance is so bad that no relevant earnings targets can be met). In contrast, well over 90% of firms in each of the small forecast error intervals examined in table 3 take no special items, suggesting that the use of special items is not a preferred method of inflating earnings to beat forecasts.
larger and more frequent cases of extreme, negative unexpected accruals. 23 Similarly, it is possible that misclassification contributes to the finding that mean, median, and percentage positive accruals increase in stock recommendations for the entire distribution of unexpected accruals. Our findings in support of H 1 are consistent with the evidence in McNichols [2000] , who reports a positive association between expected growth (which is positively associated with stock recommendations) and both the sign and the magnitude of unexpected accruals. Although
McNichols performs no formal tests of misclassification, she interprets this association as evidence of increasing misclassification of non-discretionary accruals as expected growth increases.
Differential timeliness/care in forecasting
An explanation for the observed relation between forecast errors and stock recommendations is that analysts are more timely or more careful with their forecasts of earnings of firms that they rate more favorably. This could explain why the most extreme positive and negative forecast errors are associated with firms rated a Sell (see figure 5 ). If one combines this argument with the possibility that misclassification of non-discretionary accruals as discretionary is associated with extreme prior performance, then this could explain the correspondence between extreme, negative unexpected accruals and extreme, negative forecast errors for firms rated a Sell (seen in figure 5 ).
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The mean (median) number of days since the last earnings revision prior to the quarter end is 10 (2), 10 (2), and 12 (3) for Sell, Hold, and Buy recommendation stocks, respectively. These 23 The Jones Model has been the subject of a good deal of criticism in recent years as a result of claims that it tends to misclassify non-discretionary accruals as discretionary, especially in cases of extreme performance. Much of the evidence against this model relies on an assumption that firms do not manage earnings and randomly end up in the extreme performance tails. Healy [1996] reiterates the cautionary statements in Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney [1995] and Guay, Kothari, and Watts [1996] that one cannot infer the validity of this model if this assump tion if violated. Abarbanell [1999] describes how, if this assumption does not hold and extreme instances of earnings management are present in the data, evidence of "misclassification" may actually be a reflection of the model's effectiveness. Thomas and Zhang [2000] , while critical of unexpected accrual models, make a similar point. 24 It is also possible that Sell firms generate the largest positive and negative forecast errors because they have more variable and, therefore, less predictable earnings. However, we find that the standard deviation of the prior year's earnings changes (a measure of earnings predictability) for firms rated Sells, Holds, and Buys are 0.12, 0.21, and 0.16, respectively, inconsistent with Sell firms having systematically more variable earnings.
statistics suggest that earnings forecasts pertaining to firms rated a Sell are no less timely than those of firms rated a Buy. Similar findings apply to the last earnings forecast issued prior to the quarter end (unreported in tables). In addition, we find that the mean (median) number of days since the last recommendation revision is 29 (25), 28 (24), and 29 (26) for Sell, Hold, and Buy recommendation stocks, respectively, suggesting that Sell recommendations are not staler than Buy recommendations. This evidence provides no obvious indication of possible differences in the timeliness of earnings forecast revisions across the recommendation portfolio, but it is not conclusive.
Analysts' intentional omission of non-recurring items from their forecasts
As indicated earlier, our results are qualitatively similar when forecast errors are based on consensus forecasts and actual earnings as reported by Zacks and when one-time items are eliminated from estimated unexpected accruals. Nevertheless, it is possible that forecasts and adjusted unexpected accruals used in our tests are not completely free of these items. In these cases, if analysts had not intended to forecast these items, whether or not firms' recognition of them was discretionary, they could contribute to our finding of a correspondence between extreme, negative forecast errors and extreme, unexpected accruals. Furthermore, if our inability to control for these cases is systematically related to the level of recommendation, this could contribute to the finding of an increase in the size of the tail asymmetry in both forecast errors and unexpected accrual distributions, as the favorableness of stock recommendation declines.
Reinterpreting Prior Evidence
Explaining unanticipated evidence from the literature on contracting incentives
A potential contributing factor in the failure to detect earnings management where it was expected in prior studies is a focus on contracting settings that are uncommon and complex (e.g., financial distress or threat of regulatory intervention). In these settings, it is possible to identify a number of countervailing incentives that managers face-a condition that limits the likelihood that the researcher will detect evidence supporting specific incentives. In addition, the failure to account for firms' reluctance (inclination) to engage in income-decreasing (income-increasing) earnings management when their stock price is highly sensitive to earnings news may further complicate researchers' ability to identify specific types of earnings management behavior that were predicted without regard for this potential sensitivity. In this section, we consider the possible impact of failure to control for equity market incentives on results reported in the literature.
Healy [1985] predicts that managers of firms whose pre-managed earnings cannot be inflated to a level above the minimum necessary to earn bonuses will engage in earnings baths to create slack. However, Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan [1995] , Gaver, Gaver, and Austin [1995] , and Guidry, Leone, and Rock [1999] all find no evidence that managers take extreme, incomedecreasing unexpected accruals when earnings are below the minimum required to earn bonuses.
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One explanation for why firms do not engage in predicted earnings baths in this setting is that they face incentives related to the equity market that outweigh those involving earnings-based compensation. For example, if compensation is based on both stock and earnings performance, managers may be reluctant to take an earnings bath when they cannot meet the minimum for bonuses because of the threat of bad news earnings surprises that is accompanied by a decline in stock price. This argument suggests that earnings baths may be more likely for firms below the minimum for bonuses when there is little or no stock-based remuneration in the compensation scheme or when other equity market considerations are not binding.
Concerns about adverse equity market reactions to earnings news may also explain the failure to find evidence that firms that violate their debt covenants engage in earnings baths. In fact, DeFond and Jiambalvo [1994] find that when firms violate their debt covenants, they take, on average, positive abnormal accruals. Once again, the threat of negative price reactions to bad news 25 While Guidry, Leone, and Rock show that firms whose earnings fall above (below) the maximum (minimum) for bonuses take unexpected accruals that are smaller in magnitude than firms whose earnings fall in the bonus range, median accruals in their portfolios are always positive in contrast to what would be expected if they were storing cookie jar reserves (taking earnings baths). A test of whether the small negative mean accrual reported for the belowminimum portfolio (i.e., predicted earnings baths) is different from zero was not reported in table 3 of Guidry, Leone, and Rock. earnings surprises may outweigh incentives to take earnings baths even after debt covenants have been violated. This argument suggests that firms rated Holds and Buys (i.e., firms whose stock price is more sensitive to earnings news) that are in violation of their debt covenants will be less likely to engage in earnings baths than firms rated Sells that are also in violation of such covenants.
The preceding discussion suggests that the failure to control for firms' incentives to manage earnings to meet market expectations may contribute to researchers' inability to find evidence of earnings baths predicted by contracting theories. Given that sample selection criteria employed in these studies typically lead to inclusion of firms with public equity, the impact of ignoring market earnings expectations is not likely to be trivial.
As an example of the selection bias problem, consider the findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner [1994] , who examine a sample of firms with persistent losses that cut their dividends. The authors point out: "For troubled firms, i.e., those with persistent earnings problems, extant theories predict managers' accounting choices will be systematically income-increasing"
(page 114). In contrast to their expectation, DeAngelo et al. find evidence opposite to what would be predicted under contracting theories, i.e., firms with poor prior performance that cut their dividends tend to take income-decreasing accruals. They also find no notable differences in negative accruals across firms with and without binding debt covenants, suggesting the irrelevance of contracting incentives in this setting. These seemingly anomalous negative unexpected accruals are readily reconciled in our framework if dividend cuts proxy for low sensitivity of stock price to current earnings news and, hence, constitute an incentive for these firms to take incomedecreasing actions to store reserves or payback earnings from previous periods. If so, the earnings management hypothesis suggests that analysts' forecast errors following the dividend cut by firms analyzed by DeAngelo et al. will be more negative ex post than those of a suitable control group.
Analysts' incentives to intentionally bias their forecasts conditional on their recommendations
The mean and median forecast errors reported in 
Relation to the earnings expectations management hypothesis
The evidence in column 3 of table 3 is consistent with the findings of Burgstahler and Eames [1999] , Matsumoto [1999] , and Brown [1999] . These studies examine ex post forecast errors and find an unexpectedly low frequency of small, negative forecast errors. One benefit of taking into consideration the stock price sensitivity to earnings news evident in both figure 2 and table 3 is that conditioning on outstanding stock recommendations leads to the ex ante delineation of which firms in the cross section are more likely to meet or slightly beat expectations (see columns 4-6 of table 3).
The studies cited above attribute their results all or in part to firms' management of analysts' earnings expectations. If this is the case, it is not surprising that the incentive to manage analysts' expectations to beat forecasts is also increasing in stock recommendations. However, our hypotheses are distinguished from the expectation management hypothesis by the prediction that firms beat forecasts by managing earnings, not merely analysts' expectations. This represents a competing or contributing explanation for the previously documented asymmetry in the incidence of positive and negative errors near the middle of forecast error distributions. Direct evidence of no significant differences between the incidence of small positive and small negative forecast errors when these errors are based on pre-managed earnings (table 3, columns 4-7) suggests the possibility that expectation management is an incomplete explanation for the observed asymmetry.
Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we present evidence that a firm's stock price sensitivity to earnings news, as measured by outstanding stock recommendation, affects its incentives to manage earnings and, in turn, affects analysts' ex post forecast errors. In particular, we find a tendency for firms rated a Sell (Buy) to engage more (less) frequently in extreme, income-decreasing earnings management, indicating that they have relatively stronger (weaker) incentives both to take earnings baths and to increase accounting reserves than other firms. In contrast, firms rated a Buy (Sell) are more (less) likely to engage in earnings management that leaves reported earnings equal to or slightly higher than analysts' forecasts.
Our results suggest the need to revisit interpretations of previous empirical findings from a perspective that considers equity market-based incentives to manage earnings. Specifically, our work raises questions about conclusions concerning analysts' deliberately biasing forecasts or underreacting to available information drawn from summary statistics pertaining to the analysts' own forecast errors. It also raises the possibility that failure to detect the incidence of earnings baths in circumstances predicted by contracting-based theories may be, in part, attributable to a failure to control for incentives related to equity markets.
Finally, our evidence leads naturally to the question whether efforts to manage earnings can inform or can fool analysts and investors. In ongoing research we are examining analysts' and investors' reactions to earnings management conditional on stock recommendation to assess its possible motivation and impact.
where, ∆CA t = change in current assets between current and prior quarters, ∆CL t = change in current liabilities between current and prior quarters, ∆Cash t = change in cash and cash equivalents between current and prior quarters, ∆STD t = change in debt included in current liabilities between current and prior quarters, DEP t = current quarter depreciation and amortization expense, and A t = total assets.
The predicted value of non-discretionary accruals is calculated as:
where, ∆REV t = change in revenues between current and prior quarters scaled by prior quarter total assets, ∆REC t = change in net receivables between current and prior quarters scaled by prior quarter total assets, and PPE t = gross property plant and equipment scaled by prior quarter total assets.
We estimate the firm-specific parameters, α 1 , α 2 , and α 3 from the following regression, using firms that have at least ten quarters of data:
The modified Jones Model resulted in 38,545 firm-quarter measures of quarterly unexpected accruals for all firms in the Zacks recommendations and forecasts database. p1  p6  p11  p16  p21  p26  p31  p36  p41  p46  p51  p56  p61  p66  p71  p76  p81  p86  p91 p1  p4  p7  p10  p13  p16  p19  p22  p25  p28  p31  p34  p37  p40  p43  p46  p49  p52  p55  p58  p61  p64  p67  p70  p73  p76  p79  p82  p85  p88  p91 This table provides descriptive statistics on variables used in the analysis. Panel A reports the number of firms in each stock recommendation portfolio by year. The three portfolios are based on the average of the last three analyst recommendations issued prior to the last day of the firm's fiscal quarter. Portfolios BUY, HOLD, SELL include stocks with average recommendations of [1-2], (2-3], and greater than 3, respectively. Panel B reports statistics on unexpected accruals, analyst forecasts, and earnings per share (EPS). Forecast errors are defined as actual earnings (per Compustat) minus forecasted earnings (the average of the last three analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings issued prior to the last day of the fiscal quarter) divided by beginning of period stock price. Unexpected accruals are the measure produced by the Modified Jones Model (expressed as unexpected accruals per share scaled by price). EPS is earnings per share before extraordinary items. * A test of a difference between the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors for Buy vs. Hold is significant at or below a 1% level.
# A test of a difference between the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors for Buy vs. Sell is significant at or below a 1% level.
+ A test of a difference between the ratio of positive to negative forecast errors for Hold vs. Sell is significant at or below a 2% level.
Table 3
This table reports the ratio of the frequency of positive to negative forecast errors (FE) in small regions centered on zero reported forecast errors by stock recommendations. Column (1) reports the region of reported forecast errors. Column (2) provides the number of observation in that region. Columns (3)-(6) report the ratios for forecast errors based on reported earnings. Columns (7)- (10) report the ratios for forecast errors based on pre-managed earnings. Reported forecast errors are defined as actual earnings (per Compustat) minus forecasted earnings (computed as the average of the last three analyst forecasts of quarterly earnings issued prior to the last day of the fiscal quarter) divided by beginning of period stock price. Pre-managed forecast errors equal pre-managed earnings (computed as reported earnings minus unexpected accruals) minus forecasted earnings scaled by price. Unexpected accruals are the measure produced by the Modified Jones Model (expressed as a per share scaled by price).
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